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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 14-3398 
___________ 
 
GEORGE E. JOHNSON, JR., 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
JONATHAN P. RARDIN, ESQ.; SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA 
TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY; JOE CASEY, in their individual was well as their 
official capacity as state actors; ELLIS I. MEDOWAY, ESQ., in their individual as well 
as their official capacity as state actors; JEFFREY LANDOSKY, ESQ.; UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA & CLERK #2; HOWARD A. ROSENTHAL, ESQ., in their 
individual and official capacity as state actors; ARCHER & GREINER, P.C.; GARY D. 
FRY, ESQ., in their individual and official capacity as state actors 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-13-cv-05542) 
District Judge:  Honorable Mitchell S. Goldberg 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 8, 2015 
Before:  CHAGARES, JORDAN and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: September 23, 2015) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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PER CURIAM 
 Pro se Appellant George E. Johnson, Jr., appeals from a District Court order 
denying his motion filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3).  We will 
affirm. 
 In September 2013, Johnson filed a complaint in the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, primarily alleging that the Southeastern 
Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA) and its attorney committed fraud while 
defending a lawsuit brought by Johnson in state court.  The District Court sua sponte 
dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that Johnson’s claims were 
barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.  Johnson filed a notice of appeal, but we 
dismissed his appeal for failure to prosecute.  See C.A. No. 13-4374 (order entered June 
27, 2014). 
 Meanwhile, Johnson continued to seek relief in the District Court, requesting 
reconsideration and leave to file amended complaints.1  The District Court denied those 
motions by order entered February 18, 2014.  Johnson filed a “Motion to Vacate the 
Order of Feb. 18, 2014,” which the District Court denied on June 2, 2014.   
                                              
1 In particular, Johnson filed a “Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint” (Dist. 
Ct. Doc. No. 5), a “Motion for Reconsideration/And Amendment to the Motion for Leave 
to File Amended Complaint of 10/09/13” (Dist. Ct. Doc. No. 6), a “Motion to Strike 
Defendant’s Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration” (Dist. Ct. Doc. No. 14), 
and a “Petition and Motion for Relief from Judgment” (Dist. Ct. Doc. No. 17). 
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 On June 20, 2014, Johnson filed a motion under Rule 60(b)(3).  In the motion, 
Johnson sought relief from the order denying his motion to vacate.  He vaguely asserted 
fraud and misrepresentation, alleging that “the books are being cooked,” that there was a 
“conspiracy to disenfranchise” him, and that the defendants committed “professional 
malpractice.”  By order entered July 21, 2014, the District Court denied the motion, 
holding that Johnson “alleges no facts to support a finding of such egregious conduct.  
Rather, his claim rests on a mix of insinuation and misunderstanding of the electronic 
docket entries in his case.”   
 Johnson appealed.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we 
review the denial of a motion filed pursuant to Rule 60(b)(3) for abuse of discretion.  See 
Coltec Indus., Inc. v. Hobgood, 280 F.3d 262, 269 (3d Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).   
 The District Court did not abuse its discretion here.  To prevail on a Rule 60(b)(3) 
motion, the moving party must establish that the adverse party engaged in fraud or other 
misconduct, and that this misconduct prevented the moving party from fully and fairly 
presenting his case.  See Stridiron v. Stridiron, 698 F.2d 204, 206-07 (3d Cir. 1983).  
Johnson failed to provide evidence or argument demonstrating that the orders entered 
against him were the product of fraud by the defendants.  We note that it was the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine, rather than any fraud, real or imaginary, that determined the outcome 
of his complaint.  Moreover, his assertion that “fraud upon the court is found in the 
docket entries” is unfounded.  For instance, Johnson claimed “a fix was in” because the 
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docket indicates that the action arose under 28 U.S.C. § 1981 (rather than § 1983) and 
that no jury was demanded (when he did seek trial by “jury from the outset”).  Johnson 
also found suspicious the fact that the defendants entered their appearance “on the very 
same day as the filing of their response in opposition to [his] motion for reconsideration” 
and “before [he] had filed his notice of appeal.”  He also believed that fraud exists 
because the June 2, 2014, order “appears to have been something that would have been 
written by the clerk” and Johnson “knows of no responsible judge that would enter an 
order of this nature.”  These allegations are insufficient to support relief under Rule 
60(b)(3).  Therefore, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Johnson’s 
Rule 60(b)(3) motion.   
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.2 
 
 
                                              
2 Johnson’s renewed motion for appointment of counsel and his motion for oral argument 
are denied.  Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 1993).  The United States’ motion to 
summarily affirm and to stay the briefing schedule is denied. 
